When your world gets rocked...

      That awkward moment when Aristotle isn't the objectivist that you always thought he was...

      The idea that Aristotle may have been willing to accept different culturally normative explanations of virtues as acceptable, introduced two classes ago and further explored last class, raises some unexplored questions in my mind regarding virtue, vice and human flourishing. Currently, the most pressing of these questions is, "What happens when different cultures have irreconcilable conflicts of opinion on what constitutes virtuous living?"

      Some of the most apparent conflicts occur in conceptions of justice and courage across cultures. Take feudal Japan and Viking age Scandinavia for instance:

     Bushido, the Samurai code of conduct, demands absolute loyalty to superiors and strict adherence to an honor code regardless of the situation. Imagine a scenario in which a samurai's master was murdered by a large group of bandits. The samurai's duty to protect his master at all costs, and to immediately act to avenge his death in the event of failure, would dictate that the single, impossibly outnumbered warrior should attack the bandits responsible for his master's demise, regardless of the dismal likelihood of success or the unlikely chance for survival.

      Vikings, on the other hand, value individualism and glory. This means that, faced with a similar situation as above, where a friend, chieftain, or kinsman was killed unjustly, it would be perfectly permissible for the warrior to beat a retreat, and then swear a blood feud against those responsible that could last for years or even generations.

      The distinction between the two is significant... right? The first says that courage and justice are entirely dependent on motivation and the process preceding the choice to act, while the second is almost entirely concerned with results, regardless of method. If Aristotle is truly a cultural relativist when it comes to the definitions of the virtues, he would argue that this distinction has no bearing on an understanding of human flourishing. This argument holds logical water when you consider Aristotle's assertion that Eudaimonia is the goal at which virtue aims, and that virtue is not an end to itself. As a result, we can expect the action demanded by virtue to shift relative to the context of the situation. For example, the courageous thing for a person to do if they came across a mugging in progress would be different if that person were Bruce Lee than if that person were a paraplegic. If we expand "context" to include the cultural setting in which the scenario exists, then such conflicts as mentioned above are not necessarily counterexamples to Aristotle's understanding of virtue.

The question of evil.. no, the other one

        In class on Thursday, the topic of Plato's "theory of forms" was covered in discussion. As it was explained and as I understand it, this "theory" incorporates an understanding that all objects, qualities, and concepts have a perfect, unchanging, and immaterial essence. This essence is what is referred to is a form. All things, when properly ordered, then participate in and draw nearer to the form of the Good.

       Remarkably absent from this model (or at least from our conversation of it) was an understanding of evil. I find it very interesting that there are many potential ways to think about what I consider evil in light of this model. As I see it, there are two primary ways to consider evil.

        First, evil is not a unique concept, but is instead just a word given to describe things that are absolutely devoid of any participation in the Formal good. Earthly things that are not as simple to understand as a mono dimensional consideration of participation in the good are described as evil due to their lack of glaring characteristics that accompany the good. For example, a thing that is good will have courage, wisdom and temperance. Lacking these qualities, then, earns the title of "evil."

       The second way to look at evil is as a distinct idea, existing independently of the good. This model is compelling because it allows for things to exist outside of a simple two-poled spectrum. Consider duty, cruelty and mercy. There is a difference between a soldier taking the life of his enemy because it is required to protect his friends, family and way of life and acting violently because he is a sadist. It would not be good for a soldier to violate his duty, but his merciful actions can hardly be considered evil in the same way sadistic, brutal, and cruel acts of violence would be. By accepting that there is a "Form" of evil, you can explain the way that the soul reacts to corruption, betrayal, cruelty, and selfishness much more completely than by simply saying that the soul recognizes the absence of the good.

        I am neither buying nor selling either of these views, as I have yet to cobble together anything but the haziest thumbnail sketch of either position, but I find the process of inquiry engaging and stimulating. The allure of logically (dare I say it: Socratically??) picking apart the implications of both sides until a satisfactory explanation is generated appeals to me as immensely satisfying.

... And the greatest of these is love

Socrates... He does that

"In a word, then, loves is the desire to possess the good forever"

        Once again, Socrates is at the top of his game, and by "his game" I mean undermining fools' misconceptions through flawless cross examination. All, of course, while under the pseudo-sincere pretense of being completely ignorant of the topic of discussion. Socrates is kind of a jerk. But maybe that's not fair to say. It is possible that it would come across as even more inflammatory if he dropped the act altogether.

        In any case, his arguments regarding the nature of love make a large amount of sense. To begin with, he focuses on the aspect of love that he identifies as "desire." In Socrates' estimation, one never desires something that they have. If a person already possesses something and claims that they still want it, their desire could better be restated as a preference to retain possession of that thing in the future. This insight is simultaneously subtle and powerful. Consider a wedding.
        Because a wedding is one of the greatest human declarations of love, we can easily compare Socrates' definition to determine its usefulness. If two people are choosing to get married, they are claiming that they love each other more than they love any other person in existence. This claim is followed by a commitment by each party to never depart from their companion, effectively securing the possession of the object of their desire.
       
        A second component of Socrates understanding of love incorporates an element of selflessness. This selflessness is developed as a result of recognizing beauty and desiring to see that beauty grow and develop. This too mirrors a modern understanding of love. We think of loving relationships as those in which the participants pursue meeting the needs of their partner. Regarded as purer still are those individuals who are willing to prioritize their beloved's needs above their own, acting sacrificially to make the other person better off.

        Overall, it is hard to argue with Socrates' understanding of love. Even coming to the table with a Christian worldview, there is much that is compatible. He may not be the most pedagogically polite educator of all time, but you've got to appreciate the appeal of his ideas.

"I just want to take this opportunity to publicly apologize..."

Plato's Apology is basically the final comeback of the city of Athens in their decades long argument with Socrates. It went a little something like this:

Athens: "Hey! So we think these things are good"

Socrates: "Okay... but what about these problems with them"

A: "... Well what if we re-stated it this way?"

S: "Nope. Still doesn't sound right."

A: "Oh come on, don't just sit there being negative and never 

actually contributing any new ideas!!"

S: "But wisdom is knowing that what you think you know, 

you don't actually know... you know?" 

A: "..."

At some point, a vocal and influential segment of the Athenian populace got tired of Socrates' nonsense and went through the totally legitimate process of grossly misrepresenting his life's work to get him executed. Socrates, being Socrates, proceeds to take the opportunity to publicly humiliate his accusers, make a mockery of the farcical "justice" system, and try to set the record straight regarding the true value of his work as a public service to the city of Athens. 

Now lets just pause right here and take a moment to talk about what it's like holding a view that those in power find inconvenient or annoying. In fairness, we don't exactly live in Soviet Russia, where being a nuisance to the Regime results in getting shipped off to Siberia. That said, it is still political suicide for a congressman to grow a conscience and do what they think is right if it means deviating from party lines. The institutional design of the United States may protect people's rights to say, think and do what they please, but their ability to actually change those institutions is severely hampered. The incentive structure for the American politician demands that he or she do what she was elected to do, regardless of what the information on hand says is the best thing to do. Defying this incentive structure will surely result in consequences, though perhaps not of the sort that Socrates faced. In any case, those rare representatives that cross party lines because of an honest, objective evaluation of the facts deserve to be honored just as the Homeric hero to which Socrates compares himself. It takes great courage to risk one's life's work for an understanding that you've made the right choice.