The journey of 1000 words begins with...

Aristotle’s moral philosophy, as explained in his work Nicomachean Ethics, has often been interpreted as simply making objective claims about the nature of the good life and prescriptions regarding the way it is achieved. However, a deeper reading of Aristotle’s ethical views yields a subtle and complex picture that manages to retain much of the commonly held understanding. This interpretation still acknowledges that Eudaimonia is the Telos toward which all human activity is ordered, that complete virtue and a complete life are objectively and universally required for Eudaimonia’s attainment, and that virtuous action is consistent with the perfectly balanced “mean” found on the spectrum from deficiency to excess of a certain capacity. The divergence occurs when examining the way that virtuous disposition prescribes virtuous action in specific situations.

In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes it clear that the scope of his discourse excludes any conversation regarding the way a specific individual ought to respond to a specific situation, opting instead to focus on the more “scientific” pursuit of finding the highest end of human activity and the elements of the pursuit of this end that most people hold in common. When attempting to explore the region of specific prescription that Aristotle left untouched, it would be possible to believe that the mean exists at a single, objectively excellent point along the continuum from excess to deficiency, and that anything precluding an individual from acting in this way disqualifies them from acting in a fully virtuous manner. The problem with this view is that it seems to violate Aristotle’s readily apparent opinion that “the intermediate is… not one, and is not the same for all” (1106a 32-33). This paper will argue that a virtuous disposition will prescribe not one, but a range of different responses to a situation that will vary depending on the circumstantial context. Several factors contribute to this “context.” When considering such factors, one is tempted to primarily focus on scenario specific details and considerations of an individual’s capabilities and handicaps. In addition to these factors, this paper will argue that societally generated codes of conduct, expectations and norms play an important role when prescribing specific action in specific circumstances.

This perspective on Aristotelian virtue ethics is salient because it allows the possibility that two societies both might have comprehensive value and ethical systems, might provide an adequate basis for human flourishing, but might do so by prescribing actions that seem inconsistent or even incompatible with each other. It is also possible that these distinct value systems would prescribe similar courses of action, but for wildly different justifications. Under the above-described misinterpretation, such points of friction would have to be regarded as a conflict between two cultures of unequal merit, with one necessarily being more virtuous than the other. 

To challenge this misperception and reinforce the proposed concept of prescriptive relativism, this paper will draw on a comparison of two cultures, removed to each other in both time and geography. The two societies in question, Feudal Japan and Viking Age Scandinavia, both possess the necessary external conditions to facilitate Aristotle’s “complete living,” both prohibit the kinds of categorically impermissible actions that Aristotle deems inconsistent with human flourishing like murder or theft, and both possess comprehensive systems of norms and laws that encourage virtuous living and discourage vicious behavior.

Before this comparison is explored further, it is first necessary to revisit some of the basic understandings of Aristotle’s ethical views that will shape the remainder of this discussion, in an attempt to a likely objection in the bud and present a clear justification for the interpretation now being advocated for. After these primary explanations, this paper will examine each of the cultures individually, to ensure that the implications of this demonstration are clearly understood.

First is the right ordering of feelings. Aristotle asserts that virtuous individuals experience such feelings as fear, anger, pleasure and pain “at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end and in the right way” (1106a 21-24). In the course of the comparisons to follow, it will become apparent that the two societies in question have very different ideas regarding the “right” way to order feelings in one’s motivations, and the importance, or lack thereof, of motivation when determining the merit of an action. While this may appear inconsistent with Aristotelian emphasis on both the motivation and method of an action when determining its value, this discrepancy does not disqualify or undermine the purpose of this comparison. After all, the purpose of these comparisons is not to argue that Vikings or Samurai were secretly Aristotelian virtue-ethicists, but to demonstrate the flexible and robust results of looking at Aristotle’s ethical views from a certain perspective.

One reason why the interpretation of Aristotelian virtue ethics as societally relativistic is acceptable is the inherently social nature of Aristotle’s system. To begin with, Aristotle’s terminology describing the acceptability of certain actions implies social interactions and social judgments. “Praise” and “blame” are concepts that assume the presence of an observer. Such language makes no sense if the system is arguing that an action carries value independent of the judgments of the people affected by it. This is reinforced by Aristotle’s constant allusion to the necessity and value of the lawmaker to the process of creating a society in which humans flourish or fail. It is the job of the lawmaker to create a society incentivizing and facilitating the habituation of virtue. That said, Aristotle hardly expected the laws of every city, state and nation to be identical. Geography, climate, economics, and proximity to hostile populations all uniquely shape governments’ policies. This means that even societies with identical goals will have different laws due to the unique challenges that they face in developing a practically functioning society. Given these facts, no great logical leap is required to arrive at the idea that different societies, having developed uniquely due to systemic factors beyond their control, would create unique social expectations of what constitutes “praiseworthy” or “blameworthy” behavior in any given context, despite sharing an overarching goal of demanding virtuous behavior and condemning vicious behavior.